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BIDSALE-On October I, defendant made the high bid
at a bankruptcy sale of hotel properties as "Mr. Ash, trustee." Later that
same day a certificate of incorporation was executed for a corporation with
Ash as treasurer. On October 4 the proper corporate papers were filed with
the secretary of state. On October 4 the receivers receipted for the earnest
money deposit, the instrument acknowledging, as interpreted by the court,
that the receivers would look to the corporation to complete the contract
and would not look to Mr. Ash personally. On October 14, the referee
confirmed the sale to "Mr. Ash, trustee." On October 27 the corporation
ratified the acts of Mr. Ash. On October 27 the receivers were notified that
the transaction would not be completed, the property was shortly thereafter resold, and the receivers brought suit. Held, defendant was not personally liable for the loss realized by resale. Frazier v. Ash, (5th Cir. 1956)
234 F. (2d) 320.
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The court relieved defendant of liability on two separate grounds. Faced
with the contention that since defendant acted as agent for a non-existent
corporation at the time he made the contract, he was personally liable on
the contract,1 the court first concluded that although this was the general
rule, it did not apply where the parties themselves agreed to look to the
corporation alone for responsibility and the corporation ratified the contract after it came into being.2 The court's second ground for relieving
defendant of liability is based upon the peculiar aspects of the bankruptcy
sale transaction. In effect, the court ruled that the bid was binding on
defendant on the date of the auction, but that the contract as made on
confirmation was with the corporation and acted to discharge the defendant
of his liability on the bid.3 This would appear to be the better analysis of
the problem. That liability is imposed upon the bidder at the time of
acceptance of his bid but not on the receivers until the time of confirmation
is the favored rule.4 If the bidder is not a party to the contract as confirmed by the court, he should not be liable on the contract.5 This second
ground makes it apparent that the court in the first part of its opinion unnecessarily entered into the difficult field of promoter's liability on contracts
made on behalf of a non-existent corporation. 6 Having done so, however,
the court should have based its decision on the time at which the obligations of the parties become fixed under the peculiar aspects of the
bankruptcy sale procedure, rather than the supposed intent of the parties.
If the contract was formed when the sale was confirmed by the court, then
1 O'Rorke v. Geary, 207 Pa. 240, 56 A. 541 (1903); Kelner v. Baxter, L.R. 2 C.P.
174 (1866); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §306, p. 893 (1936).
2 Carle v. Corban, 127 Va. 223, 103 S.E. 669 (1920); Weeks v. San Angelo Nat. Bank,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 65 S.W. (2d) 348. See Ehrich and Bunzl, "Promoter's Contracts,"
38 YALE L. J. 1011 (1929) and BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, rev. ed., §41, P· 115 (1946).
s Principal case at 327.
4 The peculiar arrangement of binding the bidder on his bid while the receivers
are not bound until confirmation stems from the Bankruptcy Act which requires that
the sale be subject to "approval of the court." 52 Stat. 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C. (1952) §110,
sub. f. The general rule binding the purchaser on his bid is expressed in Gordon v.
Woods, (1st Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 76, and approved by COi.LIER, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL,
2d ed., §70.93 (9), p. 1044 (1956), and 4 MooRE's COLLIER §70.98, p. 1577 (1942; Supp.
1955). Contra, In re Susquehanna Chemical Corp., (W.D. Pa. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 917.
5 This situation was clearly presented in In re Childs Co., (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d)
379, a case on which the court in the principal case relied to explain this interchange
of liability. There defendant was high bidder at a bankruptcy sale, but the contract as
confirmed was with Molly Weingarten, a fictitious person. The receivers asked specific
performance against the defendant-bidder. He counterclaimed for the return of his
earnest money deposit. Specific performance was denied since defendant was not a party
to the contract, but defendant was also denied return of his deposit money since he was
bound on the bid•
.s The language of the court indicates that it employs the concept of ratification to
account for the interchange of liability between promoter and corporation. Various
theories have been advanced to explain how a corporation becomes bound by an act
done before it has come into being, e.g., ratification, adoption, continuing offer, and
novation. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, rev. ed., §38, p. 108 (1946). This problem is extensively discussed in annotations in 17 A.L.R. 452 (1922), 49 A.L.R. 673 (1927), and
123 A.L.R. 726 (1939).
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clearly the defendant is not liable, for he was acting as agent within the
scope of his authority for a corporation known by the receivers to have
come into existence several days earlier.1 If, however, the contract was
formed on the date of the bid, the defendant should be personally liable
since he was acting as agent for a non-existent corporation.8 Since the
receivers did not know that the corporation did not exist on the day of the
bid, they could not have intended to look to an unformed corporation for
responsibility. Certainly the case is a difficult one, because both the date of
the bid and that of the contract fix separate liabilities in bankruptcy sales.
The contract as confirmed, however, was with the corporation itself through
its agent, and the promoter should not be liable on it. The problem under
either theory is a narrow one of discharge of a bidder's liability at a bankruptcy sale. Although the court offers no analysis as to how this discharge
is accomplished, it is apparent that the facts lend themselves readily to the
concept of novation. Here the court pointed to the receipt to show the intention of the parties not to bind the bidder personally, i.e., the receipt in
effect acted as a novation.9 The striking and helpful aspect of this case is
that, since the contract is formed at confirmation, there is adequate opportunity to spell out the elements of novation at this time. In the instrument
that is approved by the court the intention to discharge the bidder can be
specifically expressed, and protection for the bidder from personal liability
assured. The court's holding rightly gave effect to the intention of the
parties, but the parties themselves should have been careful to assure themselves of this result by embodying the elements of a novation in the contract
formed at the time of confirmation by the court.
John Morrow

7 MECHEM, AGENCY, 4th ed., §296 (1952); BALLANTINE, CoRPORATIONS, rev. ed., §49,
p. 137 (1946).
s Note 1 supra.
9 From the Childs case, note 5 supra, it is apparent that the novation may be a
limited one for it may not restore to the bidder his earnest money.

